

The Impact of World Trade Membership on Nigeria's Trade Policy

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I. Introduction

Nigeria's consent to the World Trade Organization (WTO) on January 1, 1995, marked a central and new beginning in the country's commerce and economic history (Davey, 2020). The resolution to become part of the WTO was rooted in a broader economic strategy aimed at integrating Nigeria into the multilateral trading system. World Trade Organisation took over or succeeded the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (Balogun, 2021). The WTO promised a more structured and rules-based international trade regime, offering its members a wonderful economic cooperation (Arowolo, 2023). Faced with declining oil revenues and increasing economic pressure from international financial institutions, Nigeria turned to liberal economic reforms as a pathway to recovery and growth. The belief was that participation in the WTO would not only open up new markets for Nigerian products but also discipline domestic trade practices and enhance competitiveness through exposure to world standards (Adewuyi).

Nigeria is one sustained by economic and political development based on centralization of power, and reliance on indigenous communities to provide some refuge from the centralized state (Duyile & Oyewale, 2021). Nigeria during its formative years committed itself to the core principles of the WTO the progressive capitalism and commercialization of commerce and trade (Adebayo, 2022). With this, Nigeria posited itself to the world trade dispute settlement mechanism and enjoyed the benefits of trade negotiations and agreements that governed more than 90 percent of world trade (Okonjo, 2012). Lagos population for instance grew from 450000 people in 1962 to a million in 1970 and about two million in 1980. Nigeria's large population and roughly over 50% of the total population of the region makes it the important nation in West Africa (Duyile, 2021). . In a report made on the harbour of Nigeria in 1928, the imperial shipping committee recommended the possibility of having a second harbour in Lagos (Duyile, Ediagbonya, Buhari, & Nwachukwu, 2020). This, however, did not materialize. The Europeans inhabited the Marina (Lagos), described as the "most important street of Lagos", the Brazilian repatriates lived at Portuguese Town or Popo Aguda; the Saro or Sierra Leoneans (re captives or liberated slaves from Sierra Leone) lived at Olowogbowo; while the indigenous Lagosians occupied the rest of the Island (Duyile, The Nigerian Marine Department Contribution to the British Colonial Economy, 2016).

Limited technical capacity, weak institutional frameworks, and inconsistent trade policies have often undermined Nigeria's ability to make meaningful contributions to WTO negotiations or to utilize its rights within the organization fully (Adegbite, 2018). Nigeria's WTO membership has prompted a series of trade-related reforms. These include efforts to update boundary procedures, renovate trade infrastructure, and amend tariffs in line with international obligations (Ezeani, 2020). However, the degree to which these reforms have translated into substantial benefits remains a subject of scholarly and strategic debate (Adesanya & Anthony, 2020). Proponents, on the other hand, view WTO membership as a intentional platform that Nigeria can still influence more effectively, provided the nation leverage upon administrative capacity together with global trade dynamics with more recognizable national interests (Ezeani E. , 2023).

One of Nigeria's core obligations under the WTO is the principle of Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) treatment, which requires that any trading understanding granted to one WTO member must be extended to all other members (Arowolo, 2023). In practice, this obligation ensures that Nigeria's trade policies remain uniform and non-discriminatory, promoting fairness and predictability in its international trade relations. Closely related to the MFN obligation is the principle of national treatment, which requires that once goods have entered a country's market, they must be treated no less favorably than domestically produced goods (Adegbite, 2018). For Nigeria, this means that foreign products must not be subjected to internal taxes, laws, or regulations that would disadvantage them in comparison to local goods. This arrangement surely set up against Nigeria's domestic companies. . In terms of tariff commitments, Nigeria is obligated to bind its tariffs on a wide range of products. Bound tariffs are ceilings that cannot be exceeded, and any changes to these levels must be negotiated with affected WTO members. While Nigeria maintains some flexibility in determining applied tariff rates below these bound levels, the commitment limits its ability to raise tariffs arbitrarily to protect domestic industries.

These tariff bindings are designed to provide certainty and stability to international traders, encouraging long-term trade and investment relationships (Adewuyi).

Nigeria is also obliged to take away quantitative restrictions. Nigeria can integrate measures such as import bans under WTO exceptions, such as those related to national security, public health, or environmental protection. This agreement requires Nigeria to implement and enforce minimum standards for the protection of intellectual property rights, including patents, copyrights, trademarks, and geographical indications. While intended to encourage innovation and attract foreign investment, TRIPS compliance has proven to be challenging for Nigeria due to weak enforcement institutions, limited awareness, and the prevalence of informal economic activities. Under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Nigeria is required to gradually open up its industrial sector, which includes communication, commerce, transport, and education. Nigeria is further obligated to adhere to the WTO's transparency provisions, which require members to notify the WTO of changes in trade policies, publish relevant laws and regulations, and respond to inquiries from other members. Transparency enhances trust among trading partners and allows for the timely resolution of misunderstandings or disputes. To some scholars, WTO had continued perpetuate the Nation as a primary producer of goods and a consumer of industrialized goods. As a member, it is expected to contribute to consensus-building processes, engage in multilateral negotiations, and, where necessary, utilize the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to resolve trade conflicts. Nigeria's participation in WTO cooperation and decision-making processes reflects both its tactical interest in shaping global trade rules and the systemic limitations that have hindered its full engagement in multilateral trade diplomacy. As a developing country with a vast market and significant economic potential, Nigeria has often aligned itself with the broader coalition of developing nations within the WTO framework. In theory, the WTO structure provides developing countries with the opportunity to influence trade rules and defend their interests. Developing try to break off from the primary market mentality which makes Nigeria to consistently support the developmental concerns of the Global South and has been an active participant in various negotiation rounds, particularly the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), launched in 2001. The DDA aimed to address the trade imbalances between developed and developing countries, with Nigeria advocating for fairer access to markets, the removal of agricultural subsidies in the Global North, and increased technical assistance for trade capacity-building (Ayodele & Idris, 2022).

Despite these efforts, Nigeria's overall influence in WTO negotiations has been restricted by a number of factors. One of the major challenges is the limited capacity of Nigeria's trade negotiation institutions. Unlike countries such as South Africa, Brazil, or India, which have developed highly specialized trade missions and dedicated WTO teams, Nigeria often lacks the mechanical manpower and know how needed to sustain complex power and commerce negotiations. As a result, the country's positions are sometimes knee-jerk rather than calculated, and follow-up on obligations or opportunities is inconsistent. In some cases, Nigeria has taken contradictory positions in bilateral and multilateral trade platforms, raising questions about the country's consistency and credibility as a negotiating partner.

Despite these challenges, there have been efforts in recent years to enhance Nigeria's role in WTO negotiations. The Nigerian Office for Trade Negotiations (NOTN), established in 2017, was created to centralize and professionalize trade policy management. Its mandate includes developing coherent trade strategies, coordinating Nigeria's position in multilateral and bilateral negotiations, and ensuring that trade policy serves broader national development goals (Adesanya & Anthony, 2020). Under the guidance of the NOTN, Nigeria has taken a more structured approach to trade diplomacy, including increased participation in WTO working groups, capacity-building programs, and stakeholder consultations.

The obligations of World Trade Organization (WTO) membership has proven to be a formidable challenge for Nigeria due to a combination of structural, institutional, economic, and political factors. While WTO membership offers the promise of greater access to global markets, predictability in trade relations, and the opportunity to influence international trade rules, Nigeria has encountered numerous hurdles in meeting the commitments required under the organization's agreements. These challenges have constrained the country's ability to fully integrate into the global trading system and derive the anticipated developmental benefits.

One of the most pressing challenges is the weakness of Nigeria's institutional and regulatory framework. Many of the obligations under WTO agreements—such as the implementation of tariff bindings, enforcement of intellectual property rights under the TRIPS agreement, and adoption of customs modernization under the Trade Facilitation Agreement—require well-coordinated, transparent, and efficient government agencies. Unfortunately, Nigeria's trade-related institutions are often plagued by bureaucratic inefficiencies, corruption, inadequate technical expertise, and overlapping mandates. For example, the Nigerian Customs Service has made strides in automating border procedures, yet many importers still face delays, irregular fees, and inconsistent application of rules, making it difficult to meet WTO standards on trade facilitation (Davey, 2020).

In addition, the lack of infrastructural development remains a major obstacle. Poor road networks, inefficient ports, unreliable electricity supply, and limited access to high-speed internet hamper the ease of doing business and increase the cost of compliance with WTO rules. For instance, Nigerian manufacturers and exporters struggle to meet the technical and sanitary standards required to enter international markets due to the lack of laboratories, quality assurance facilities, and trained personnel. This has led to frequent rejection of Nigerian exports, particularly in the European Union, which imposes strict product standards. The inability to meet such standards reflects the wider challenge of harmonizing domestic practices with international obligations.

Another critical issue is the limited capacity of Nigerian trade negotiators and policymakers to effectively engage with the highly technical and evolving WTO framework. Unlike more active WTO members such as India, South Africa, or Brazil, Nigeria has not invested sufficiently in building a dedicated cadre of trade experts. The absence of well-trained trade diplomats and legal specialists means that Nigeria often lacks the capacity to interpret, implement, and defend its rights under WTO law. This shortfall has also restricted the country's use of the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism to protect its interests, as seen in Nigeria's absence from key trade disputes that could have addressed the dumping of subsidized agricultural products into its market.

Furthermore, Nigeria's domestic economic policies often conflict with its WTO commitments, creating inconsistencies that make compliance difficult. For example, Nigeria has periodically implemented import bans, restrictions, and foreign exchange controls in response to economic crises or to protect local industries. While such measures may serve short-term national interests, they are often in tension with WTO rules that discourage quantitative restrictions and promote free trade. The Central Bank of Nigeria's foreign exchange policy in recent years, which restricted access to forex for the importation of certain goods, has been criticized for violating the spirit of trade liberalization and for creating a dual exchange rate system that distorts trade competitiveness.

Another challenge lies in the political economy of trade policy in Nigeria. Trade decisions are often influenced by vested interests, political patronage, and short-term economic considerations, rather than long-term developmental goals. The lack of consistent trade policy direction, as well as weak coordination among key ministries—such as Trade and Investment, Finance, Agriculture, and Foreign Affairs—results in fragmented and reactive trade governance. This has made it difficult to develop a coherent strategy for WTO engagement or to prioritize reforms that would enhance compliance with global trade obligations. The informal nature of a large segment of Nigeria's economy also poses a challenge to fulfilling WTO obligations. Many small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) operate outside the regulatory framework, making it difficult for the government to enforce standards, collect accurate trade data, or extend compliance support. This limits the ability of Nigerian businesses to benefit from WTO opportunities such as special and differential treatment provisions, export promotion schemes, and trade capacity-building initiatives.

Finally, inadequate public awareness and stakeholder involvement in WTO-related matters have further undermined compliance efforts. Many business operators, civil society organizations, and even public officials lack a clear understanding of Nigeria's obligations under the WTO. This has led to limited domestic accountability and poor public pressure for reform. In contrast, countries that have institutionalized multi-stakeholder trade dialogues, such as Kenya and Ghana, have been more successful in integrating WTO norms into national development plans.

II. Impact of Nigeria's Membership in the World Trade Organisation

The impact of Nigeria's membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) on its economic policy has been both insightful and transformative, redirecting the country's approach to international trade and redefining its policy framework to align with global standards. Since joining the WTO in 1995, Nigeria has had to streamline its trade policies to conform to the polygonal principles of lucidity, liberalization, predictability, and non-discrimination. One of the most significant changes influenced by WTO membership is Nigeria's adoption of a more freethinking import tax and export tax regime (Okonjo, 2012). As part of its commitments, Nigeria bound certain tariff rates, ensuring that they do not exceed agreed ceilings. This measure enhanced inexorableness in trade policy, which is crucial for investor confidence and long-term trade planning. Although Nigeria retains some suppleness in setting applied tariffs below bound rates, WTO rules limit arbitrary increases, thereby promoting policy reliability and intelligibility. The WTO has also played a key role in shaping Nigeria's approach to import and export licensing, customs procedures, and trade facilitation. With encouragement from WTO trade facilitation initiatives, Nigeria has undertaken reforms to streamline customs administration, reduce import processing times, and combat smuggling and corruption at its borders. Institutions like the Nigeria Customs Service have been restructured to incorporate digital technologies such as the Nigeria Integrated Customs Information System (NICIS), which aims to improve efficiency and reduce trade costs.

These reforms, although uneven in implementation, have contributed to easing cross-border trade and improving Nigeria's ranking in global ease of doing business reports.

However, the impact of WTO membership on Nigeria's trade policy has not been without controversy or limitations. Critics argue that liberal trade policies inspired by WTO commitments have exposed local industries to unfair competition, especially in sectors where Nigerian producers lack comparative advantage. The removal or reduction of tariffs on certain imported goods has sometimes undermined domestic production, particularly in manufacturing and agriculture. For example, Nigeria's textile industry has struggled to survive under the pressure of cheap imports from Asia, leading to factory closures and job losses (Balogun, 2021). In this context, there is an ongoing policy debate about the appropriate balance between liberalization and protection for strategic sectors. Nigeria has often faced challenges in fully implementing WTO-acquiescent policies due to weak institutional capacity, policy incoherence, and economic instability. Recurrent changes in economic and pecuniary policy—such as import bans and foreign exchange restrictions—have sometimes contradicted WTO principles, drawing criticism from commercial partners and international observers. These contradictions reflect a deeper struggle within Nigeria's trade policy framework to reconcile short-term macroeconomic management with long-term trade commitments. In spite of these challenges, WTO membership has created a foundation for Nigeria to modernize its trade policy infrastructure and engage more constructively in global trade governance. It has provided a platform for policy dialogue, capacity building, and technical assistance aimed at helping Nigeria meet its development goals through trade. The WTO's role in shaping Nigeria's economic policy has therefore been both normative and practical.

The outcomes of Nigeria's membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) on its manufacturing and agricultural sectors have been deeply momentous, revealing intermingle of opportunities, vulnerabilities, and structural challenges. While WTO membership was initially envisioned as a spur for Nigeria to develop its economy, diversify beyond oil, and stimulate manufacturing and agricultural productivity through increased trade integration, the outcomes in these two vital sectors have been mixed and, in many cases, problematic. The textile and garment industries serve as heartrending examples. Once a thriving sector that provided jobs for hundreds of thousands of Nigerians, the textile industry has significantly declined since the early 2000s. With the Nigerian market flooded by economical second-hand clothes and fabric imports, many local factories could not compete and were forced to shut down. Similarly, the cement and automobile assembly sectors experienced disruptions due to the challenge of competing with better-priced and higher-quality imports. While some segments of the industrial sector, such as telecommunications and construction materials, have seen growth due to liberalization and increased foreign investment, the overall industrial landscape remains fragile and under-diversified. On the agricultural front, WTO membership has had both enabling and inhibiting consequences. On the one hand, it created potential avenues for Nigerian agricultural products to access international markets. Nigeria has proportional advantages in products like cocoa, sesame seeds, ginger, palm oil, and cassava. WTO frameworks, in theory, offered Nigerian farmers the opportunity to reach broader markets through reduced tariff barriers and global value chains. However, these opportunities have not been fully realized due to Nigeria's poor infrastructure, lack of standardization, and non-compliance with international sanitary measures. As a result, many Nigerian agricultural exports face rejection in high-standard markets such as the European Union.

On the contrary, the liberalization of agricultural imports has harmed Nigeria's domestic food production capacity. The removal of trade barriers under WTO rules has led to the flooding of the Nigerian market with subsidized agricultural products from developed countries, such as rice, poultry, fish, and vegetable oil. These cheap imports undercut local farmers who struggle to compete due to low productivity, inadequate mechanization, poor extension services, and erratic government support. The poultry sector is a notable casualty; imported frozen chicken, often sold below production cost due to export subsidies in the countries of origin, displaced local poultry farmers and contributed to job losses in rural communities. The structural imbalance created by this liberalization has made Nigeria increasingly dependent on food imports, undermining food security and exacerbating rural poverty. Moreover, WTO rules restrict Nigeria's ability to freely use protective instruments such as tariffs and subsidies to support struggling agricultural and industrial sectors. While some suppleness exists under special and discrepancy treatment provisions, Nigeria has not fully capitalized on these allowances due to capacity constraints and weak policy coordination. Nonetheless, WTO membership has catalyzed some reform efforts aimed at improving sector performance. Nigeria's agriculture transformation agenda, attempts to implement national industrial policies, and recent border control measures to curb smuggling reflect the government's recognition of the need to shield and support local producers while remaining within the limits of mutual commitments. Programs to encourage rearward assimilation in industries like cement and sugar have recorded moderate success, suggesting that WTO-aligned policies can still be adapted to support national development if effectively designed and implemented.

Nigeria's experience with export diversification and market access since joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been marked by limited progress and persistent structural constraints. Although WTO

membership opened opportunities for Nigeria to expand its exports and integrate more effectively into the global trading system, the country's performance in diversifying its export base beyond crude oil has remained largely unimpressive. Despite global encouragement for developing economies to broaden their export portfolios, Nigeria continues to rely heavily on oil and gas, which account for over 90% of its export earnings. This overdependence on a single commodity has made the economy highly vulnerable to fluctuations in global oil prices and has impeded the development of non-oil sectors.

One of the anticipated benefits of WTO membership was enhanced market access for Nigerian goods and services, particularly through the reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers in key international markets. In principle, WTO rules promote fairer competition and lower entry barriers, offering developing countries like Nigeria the potential to tap into new export destinations. However, Nigeria has struggled to leverage these opportunities due to several domestic and external factors. Internally, the lack of competitiveness in the non-oil sectors—driven by poor infrastructure, high production costs, erratic electricity supply, insecurity, and inadequate policy support—has limited Nigeria's ability to produce goods at a scale and quality that meet international market demands. For instance, while Nigeria has comparative advantages in agricultural commodities like cocoa, sesame, ginger, hibiscus, and cassava products, challenges related to post-harvest losses, poor processing standards, limited access to finance, and weak compliance with international sanitary and phytosanitary standards have hindered their competitiveness in the global market. Nigerian exporters frequently face the rejection of consignments in developed markets such as the European Union due to issues related to safety, packaging, and traceability. This reflects broader capacity gaps in Nigeria's trade infrastructure and regulatory oversight.

Export diversification efforts have also been affected by policy inconsistency and a weak industrial base. Programs such as the Nigerian Industrial Revolution Plan (NIRP) and the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP) have included targets for boosting non-oil exports, yet implementation has been slow and fragmented (Ezeani E. , 2023). Frequent changes in trade policy—such as the banning and unbanning of certain exports, inconsistent tariff applications, and restrictions on access to foreign exchange—have undermined investor confidence and complicated export planning for producers. Nonetheless, there have been some modest improvements. Sectors such as information and communications technology (ICT), creative industries (such as Content Creation and Nigerian music), and some segments of agribusiness have begun contributing to export earnings, albeit on a small scale. Digital platforms have also enabled some Nigerian entrepreneurs to reach foreign markets, bypassing traditional export channels. However, these gains are still marginal compared to the overarching dominance of oil exports.

The socio-economic outcomes of Nigeria's membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) reflect a complex interplay between the theoretical expectations of trade liberalization and the empirical realities of a developing economy grappling with structural inefficiencies. While WTO accession was envisioned as a gateway to enhanced economic growth, increased employment opportunities, technological transfer, and poverty reduction, the outcomes thus far have been uneven and, in many cases, contrary to the developmental aspirations that informed Nigeria's decision to join the global trade body in 1995. One of the most pronounced socio-economic consequences has been the widening gap between trade liberalization and inclusive development. Although Nigeria has made some gains in market integration and has witnessed modest improvements in certain export sectors, the broader economic impact has not translated into substantial improvement in the living standards of the majority of Nigerians. The anticipated trickle-down effects of trade openness—such as job creation, income growth, and poverty alleviation—have largely failed to materialize. Instead, liberalized trade, particularly in the absence of robust domestic safeguards and strategic industrial policy, has led to the contraction of labor-intensive sectors, such as textile manufacturing and small-scale agriculture, thereby exacerbating unemployment and deepening income inequality.

In the agricultural sector, WTO-inspired trade liberalization has contributed to the influx of subsidized food imports, notably rice, poultry, fish, and dairy products, which has adversely affected local farmers. Many rural producers, lacking access to finance, modern technology, and infrastructure, have been unable to compete with cheaper foreign goods. This has led to the displacement of traditional livelihoods, rural-urban migration, and increased food insecurity, particularly in northern Nigeria. Furthermore, the erosion of agricultural competitiveness has deprived the economy of a critical engine for job creation and rural development, weakening the socio-economic fabric of many communities. The industrial sector has also experienced adverse effects. The reduction in tariffs and removal of protective trade measures have exposed Nigerian industries to foreign competition without commensurate investment in domestic capacity-building. As a result, many small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have either collapsed or operated below capacity due to an influx of imported substitutes. The decline of local industries has not only limited value addition within the economy but has also reduced employment opportunities, particularly for semi-skilled and unskilled labor, thereby fueling underemployment and informal sector expansion.

Moreover, the expected social benefits of WTO membership—such as improved access to quality goods, lower consumer prices, and enhanced technology transfer—have been mixed. While some urban consumers have benefited from a wider variety of imported goods, these benefits have been offset by inflationary pressures, exchange rate volatility, and a weakened naira, which have eroded purchasing power. The promise of technology and knowledge transfer, particularly in the services and manufacturing sectors, has not been fully realized due to weak intellectual property enforcement, inadequate human capital development, and the absence of strong research and development (R&D) linkages. From a macroeconomic perspective, Nigeria's trade-to-GDP ratio remains relatively low compared to emerging economies, underscoring the limited extent to which global trade has been harnessed as a driver of growth. The country's over-reliance on crude oil exports and the slow pace of economic diversification continue to expose it to external shocks, thereby limiting the socio-economic resilience that WTO membership was expected to foster. Furthermore, the absence of a coherent national trade strategy that is aligned with the country's development goals has weakened Nigeria's ability to utilize WTO platforms to advance its socio-economic interests effectively.

Another critical dimension of the socio-economic outcomes lies in the area of institutional capacity and governance. WTO membership requires transparent, rules-based trade governance and accountability. However, Nigeria continues to face challenges related to policy inconsistency, regulatory inefficiencies, and bureaucratic inertia, which undermine investor confidence and hinder the full realization of WTO-linked development outcomes. These governance deficits have further limited Nigeria's capacity to benefit from technical assistance and special and differential treatment provisions available to developing countries under WTO agreements.

III. Concluding Remark

This study examined the impact of Nigeria's membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) with a focus on its implications for the country's trade policy, industrial and agricultural development, export diversification, and broader socio-economic outcomes. Since joining the WTO in 1995, Nigeria has undertaken various trade reforms aimed at aligning its policies with global trade rules. The study explored how these reforms have influenced Nigeria's economic structure, shaped institutional behavior, and affected both productive sectors and social well-being. The analysis began by outlining the origins, functions, and organizational framework of the WTO, highlighting its central objectives of trade liberalization, transparency, and dispute resolution. It then traced Nigeria's accession to the WTO and the obligations it assumed as a member, including tariff binding, non-discrimination principles, intellectual property rights, and the liberalization of services. Despite these commitments, the study revealed that Nigeria has faced considerable challenges in fulfilling its WTO obligations, stemming from institutional weaknesses, inadequate infrastructure, poor policy coordination, and limited trade negotiation capacity.

Findings showed that WTO membership has had mixed effects on Nigeria's trade policy. On one hand, it encouraged liberalization, transparency, and regulatory reform; on the other, it exposed Nigeria's industries to intense international competition without sufficient domestic capacity to compete. The manufacturing sector, particularly textiles, suffered severe setbacks due to cheap imports, while agricultural producers struggled against subsidized foreign goods, leading to reduced domestic output and job losses (Adewuyi). In terms of export diversification and market access, the study noted that Nigeria remains heavily dependent on crude oil, with limited success in developing its non-oil export base. Structural constraints, including quality control issues, logistics challenges, and non-compliance with international standards, continue to limit Nigeria's competitiveness in global markets. Furthermore, Nigeria has not effectively leveraged WTO platforms for dispute resolution or strategic negotiations, reducing its influence in shaping global trade rules. Socio-economically, the study found that WTO-induced trade liberalization has not delivered the expected developmental gains. While some urban consumers have benefitted from access to imported goods, many local producers have been displaced, rural livelihoods disrupted, and employment opportunities diminished. The absence of a strong industrial base, persistent governance issues, and policy inconsistency have hindered Nigeria's ability to convert trade openness into inclusive growth and structural transformation.

In conclusion, Nigeria's membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been both a strategic milestone and a complex challenge in the country's pursuit of economic development and global integration. While WTO accession in 1995 was undertaken with the intention of stimulating trade liberalization, attracting foreign investment, enhancing market access, and driving economic diversification, the outcomes have been mixed and, in many respects, underwhelming. Nigeria's experience reveals that WTO membership, though offering substantial opportunities, does not automatically translate into economic transformation without the requisite domestic capacity, policy coherence, and institutional readiness. The study has demonstrated that trade liberalization under the WTO framework has led to increased competition, which has exposed the structural weaknesses of Nigeria's industrial and agricultural sectors. Local industries have struggled to compete with foreign imports, especially in the absence of robust protective policies or competitive advantages, resulting in

job losses, factory closures, and declining productivity. Similarly, the agricultural sector has faced setbacks due to cheap, often subsidized food imports, undermining rural livelihoods and food security. These realities underscore the limitations of liberal economic integration when not matched with strategic national development policies.

Moreover, Nigeria's trade policy has often been inconsistent, reactive, and misaligned with its WTO obligations, reducing its credibility and effectiveness in multilateral trade engagements. The country has also failed to fully exploit the legal and diplomatic tools available within the WTO—such as the dispute settlement mechanism or special and differential treatment provisions—to defend and promote its interests. This underutilization is largely due to weak institutional frameworks, insufficient technical expertise, and poor inter-agency coordination. Despite these challenges, Nigeria's membership in the WTO remains a valuable platform for economic engagement, offering access to global markets, technical assistance, and international best practices. However, for Nigeria to derive meaningful and inclusive benefits, there must be a deliberate and sustained effort to reform its trade and industrial policies, strengthen institutional capacity, invest in infrastructure, and promote value addition across key sectors. Trade must be harnessed not as an end in itself but as a tool for national development, poverty reduction, and structural transformation.

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